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 ‘Sustainable development is a development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.’ (WCED 1987) 
Aims and objectives of the research project GeNECA  
Sustainability policy has to consider the interdependencies of human life and nature; it has to 
meet the high moral standards of intra- and intergenerational justice set by the Brundtland 
Commission in 1987; and, finally, it has to motivate people to behave accordingly. This is 
quite a challenging task that often is responded to in a too simplistic way. Current 
sustainability science and civic engagement often focus on the environmental dimensions 
and herewith on intergenerational justice.  
The Capability Approach is a leading paradigm in development economics that has informed 
development policy during the last 20 years. With its focus on human development it has 
highlighted the interaction between social and economic development. The issue of 
intragenerational justice constitutes an ongoing motive within the Capability Approach, but 
intergenerational justice and environmental concerns have often been left out of its scope.  
The project GeNECA aims at conceptualizing sustainable development on the basis of the 
Capability Approach so as to combine the issues of inter- and intragenerational justice 
drawing on an integrated understanding of social, economic and environmental development. 
Resuming the spirit of the Brundtland commission, GeNECA puts the needs and capabilities 
of people all over the world, now and in future into its focus.  
On the basis of conceptual reflections, current sustainability indicators will be complemented 
by capability-based indicators. The concept will further be used in case studies on various 
areas of governance to prove its usefulness in decision processes. A feedback mechanism 
will be installed to amend the conception to the demands of applicability.  
GeNECA is a 3 years research project (04/2010-03/2013) funded by the German ministry for 
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Abstract: 
The politically influential idea of sustainable development is closely tied to the concept of 
inter- and intragenerational justice without clarifying these concepts and their relationship. In 
developing an account of human development, the capability approach conceptualizes parts of 
intragenerational  justice,  but  not  intergenerational  justice.  After  explaining  briefly  our 
motivation by establishing the link to sustainable development, this paper aims to close the 
gap  in  two  steps:  first,  it  clarifies  elements  of  a  universal  theory  of  justice.  Second,  it 
examines  how  well  the  CA  can  take  up  these  elements  before  drafting  how  this  would 
translate back to the political context of sustainable development. 
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1.  Introduction 
Motivated by the ongoing discussion on sustainable development, we aim to bring together 
two things in this paper: Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capability approach and a theoretical account 
of intergenerational justice – two discussions which have often run separately. The goal of 
this  paper  is  largely  explicative:  it  characterizes  the  potential  of  the  capability  approach 
(henceforth “CA”) in answering questions of intergenerational justice. It has three parts: First 
we enter the issue of intergenerational justice by explaining our motivations briefly: we want 
to  shed some more light  on the important,  but notoriously difficult  notion of  sustainable 
development. In the second part we characterize the main elements of a theory of justice, 
which yields a structure along which we develop our account of intergenerational justice. In 
this discussion we identify specific philosophical issues of the intergenerational context. 
The third part introduces the CA into this discussion. We claim that the CA makes a theory of 
intergenerational justice more plausible in three important ways. First, the CA determines the 
metric  for  a  theory  of  intergenerational  justice.  Second,  specific  problems  of  the 
intergenerational context can be tackled by building a basic threshold of human well-being 
based on the CA. Third, we make a connection to sustainable development, since the CA 
provides insights about the problem of human development. On the negative side, however, it 
has to be admitted that the CA still exhibits considerable gaps. We will thus conclude by 
pointing out the most pressing questions that need to be addressed in further discussion.  
2. Sustainability: our main motivation 
The conceptual core of sustainable development (henceforth “SD”), a concept widely referred 
to in politics, society and science, is hard to grasp from a merely philosophical perspective
1. Under the heading of SD a number of (partly) inter -related issues such as environmental 
exploitation, demographic changes, economic destabilization by financial crisis or poverty are 
subsumed.  Hence,  SD  rather  constitutes  a  global,  political  agenda  than  a  theoretical 
conception.  
In the face of existing conceptual ambiguities some authors eve n go as far as to dismiss the 
concept of sustainability altogether (e.g. Redclif 2005) or to turn from substantial to more 
procedural oriented definitions (Enquete-Kommission 1998). Yet, we believe that the ideas 
and ambitions behind sustainability are far  too important to dispense with the notion. Our 
main motivation in this paper is to frame and partly refocus the normative dimension of SD 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we use the terms “sustainability” and “sustainable development” interchangeably. 3 
by developing a CA-based notion of intergenerational justice. The reason behind this is as 
follows: The scientific sustainability discourse has put much emphasis on the strategic issues 
of SD (e.g. substitution of natural capital, technological efficiency gains, sufficient lifestyles, 
Neumeyer 2010), but tends to neglect the substantial aim of sustained human well-being. On 
the  other  hand,  the  sustainability  definition  brought  up  by  the  World  Commission  on 
Environment  and  Development  (Brundtland  Commission)  requests  both  inter-  as  well  as 
intragenerational justice, but underestimates the role of ecosystems to sustain human well-
being. With this paper, we therefore want to relate the philosophical debate about justice to 
political aims. Also, we sketch how the discourse on human development and substantial 
well-being could contribute to fill out the notion of intergenerational justice differently from 
the current sustainability discussions. 
One  obvious  starting  point  is  the  numerously  cited  Brundtland  definition  that  takes 
sustainability  to  be  “[...]  development  that  meets  the  needs  of  the  present  without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” (WCED 1987) The 
ethical  foundations  underlying  this  definition  as  well  as  its  practical  implications  remain 
unclear. It will therefore be only of limited use in the present discussion, unless it can be 
linked to a more substantial value theory. We aim to provide this by using the CA.  
A major problem is that Brundtland mixes up aspects of inter- and intragenerational justice 
without clarification of their conceptual (or normative) status for SD. Hence, it opens the 
floodgates for a “catch all”-interpretation of sustainability. Both inter- and intragenerational 
justice pose some complicated philosophical problems; it is therefore hard to imagine how to 
construct  a  unitary  philosophical  theory  that  encompasses  all  the  issues  it  is  designed  to 
address.  
In  this  paper,  we  can  also,  of  course,  only  address  part  of  these  difficulties.  One  of  our 
concerns is a proper definition of the objective of SD. In a similar vein as Brundtland, we 
believe that SD is tied up with intergenerational justice and the protection of human well-
being. In what follows we clear up how we define these concepts and their relationship. 
3. Intra- and Intergenerational Justice  
The topic of justice is quite complex in general and questions of intergenerational justice 
belong  to  the  most  difficult  of  the  subject.  Before  we  delve  into  the  specifics  of 
intergenerational justice, it is therefore necessary to take a step back and examine the basic 
structure of a theory of justice. This helps us  to categorize questions of intergenerational 
justice and clarify how they diverge from issues of justice between contemporaries. We will 4 
identify four major issues that a comprehensive theory of justice needs to address in one way 
or other.  
a.  Elements of a theory of justice 
Many  modern  philosophical  theories  of  social  justice  are  motivated  by  questions  of  fair 
distribution  of  advantages  among  contemporaries:  how  are  benefits  and  burdens  to  be 
allocated fairly within a certain group or society given that benefits and valuable resources are 
scarce? How does a national (or supranational) state need to be structured that it enables 
people to live a good life – or at least a decent one (Lamont and Favor 2008). This way of 
framing issues of justice has been considerably influenced by John Rawls’ (1971) theory of 
“justice as fairness”, which frames justice mainly as a matter of distribution of goods and 
constructing the respective institutional arrangements. Rawls’ theory presents a paradigm of 
how such theories are structured. Based on his theory we identify four realms of a theory of 
social justice: 
(i)  Metric of Justice: A first important question any theorist of justice needs to ask, 
how  to  measure  individual  advantage,  i.e.  the  “currency  of  justice”  (Robeyns 
2009). That is, a theory of justice needs to specify an evaluative space in which we 
should evaluate justice. Often this is couched in terms of personal advantage or 
well-being as the object that justice is to preserve or promote. The most common 
metrics suggested are resources or preference fulfillment. More refined accounts 
can be found in Rawls’ account of primary goods or in theories of basic rights 
such as the human rights approach. 
(ii)  Principles of justice: This comprises what Edward Page (2007) calls the “pattern 
of  justice”:  the  selection  of  an  appropriate  distributive  aim,  such  as  equality, 
priority or sufficiency, is fundamentally involved in the formulation of principles 
that regulate how much of a given “currency of justice” the subjects of justice are 
entitled to receive. Most theories offer an account how governmental institutions 
should be structured in order to comply with the demands of a just distribution. 
Rawls, for instance, constructs two principles of justice in order to regulate the 
allocation of primary goods.  
(iii)  Justification: The standards and principles just mentioned are usually based on 
philosophical  arguments  or  models  of  society  that  serve  as  a  theoretical 
foundation. Rawls, for instance, employs his now famous model of the original 
position,  in  which  people  (or  rather  representatives  of  people)  decide  over 5 
principles of justice behind a “veil of ignorance”. This device is used to grant 
objectivity and impartiality in the choice of principles.  
(iv)  Scope of a theory of justice: Most theorists take their respective theory of justice as 
universal in a more or less strict sense. In the former interpretation, it demands that 
principles of justice are valid for all human beings regardless of their place in the 
world or in history. In a more confined way, justice is limited to some unit, e.g. a 
certain society or group of people. Traces of both notions can be found in the work 
of Rawls over the years.  
The  four  elements  just  identified  are  usually  defined  with  regard  to  justice  among 
contemporaries. In some cases, it seems quite difficult to apply them to the intergenerational 
context, i.e. to people who do not exist today. Yet, analyzing the Brundtland definition along 
these lines shows the following: (i) it suggests needs as a metric of justice. (ii) it does not 
announce explicit principles of justice, but rather gives recommendations for governmental 
actors on how to move towards more inter- and intragenerational justice. (iii) it relies on 
moral  intuition  for  justification.  And,  (iv),  it  views  all  human  beings  as  the  scope  for 
sustainable  development  as  shown  in  numerous  UN  declarations  and  international 
agreements.  
b.  Extending intragenerational theories 
Intergenerational questions are special – or so it seems. The core concern of intergenerational 
justice is, why present generations owe something to future generations, what they owe to 
them and how much of it? (Ott and Döring 2004) Answering these issues involves not only 
guesswork  about  how  people  will  live.  We  must  also  acknowledge  that  our  actions  may 
influence  the  situation  of  these  people,  even  their  very  existence.  Yet,  it  is  questionable 
whether an answer to this question requires sui generis principles or whether intergenerational 
justice is “just” an extension of intragenerational justice. We see two reasons why we should 
start from an intragenerational point of view. First, as Brian Barry (1997) states, we are more 
accustomed to think about relations among contemporaries and have already developed an 
apparatus to deal with them. We have no similar apparatus to help us deal with relations to 
future people. Second, we think that demands of intergenerational justice should not differ 
significantly from intragenerational ones, if a theory of justice is taken to be truly universal. 
The core idea of giving all people the chance to live a good life is ethically fundamental and 
universal.  Hence,  a  theory  of  intergenerational  justice  can  be  categorized  along  the 
requirements identified above: 6 
(i)  Metric of Justice: an account of intergenerational justice needs a plausible metric 
of human advantage that needs to be protected for present and future generations. 
One problem here is whether future individuals can be the bearer of claims and 
rights vis-à-vis present  generations,  especially  when we consider that  our very 
actions  influence  their  very  existence.  This  problem  of  non-identity  will  be 
discussed below. 
(ii)  Principles  of  justice:  it  needs  principles  and  patterns  that  tell  us  how  the 
advantages selected in (i) are allocated fairly within and across generations. This 
includes determining to how much of them each generation is entitled. One quite 
contentious point for the intergenerational context is the structure of the principles 
of  fair  allocation,  e.g.  egalitarian,  sufficientarian  etc.,  because  of  varying 
population size. 
(iii)  Justification: At its starting point, an account of intergenerational justice needs to 
explain why one generation owes something to another generation at all and, more 
specifically with regard to SD, why we owe something to future generations.  
(iv)  Scope of a theory of justice: As it has been mentioned, it needs to aim at a truly 
universal theory of justice.
2 It is not by the membership to a specific generation 
that an individual can be granted special moral value. 
The structure just identified shows the need for introducing substantial philosophical theory 
of  intergenerational  justice.  The  demand  for  universality  justifies  that  future  generations 
should somehow factor in a theory of justice. But it does not help us to determine the most 
critical issues, e.g. what we owe to future individuals and why. Answering those questions 
requires  a  substantial  theory.  Before  we  examine  to  which  extent  the  CA  meets  these 
conditions, we lay out the most special features of intergenerational justice, which will then 
be picked up again with regard to the CA. 
c.  Critical Problems for a theory of intergenerational justice 
In the following part we first discuss the most pressing issues for intergenerational justice that 
we aim to tackle with the help of the CA.
3 
                                                 
2 In this context “universal” refers to human beings. We will sketch below why we prefer an anthropocentric 
approach nevertheless. In the realm of SD this position is often criticized as “anthropocentric”, but a more 
detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. 
3 We find several works in philosoph ical literature which are devoted to  specific intergenerational questions. 
Axel  Gosseries’  work  in  the  field  provides  an  extensive  treatment  of  the  subject,  cf.  e.g.  “Introduction  - 
Intergenerational Justice and Its Challenges” in Gosseries and Meyer (2009). Tim Mulgan also provides a good 
overview in his development of a moderate consequentialist account (cf. Mulgan (2008)). We cannot go into all 
of these complex questions here, mainly for reasons of space. In what follows we concentrate on questions that 
are relevant in our project of introducing the CA into the discussion.  7 
i) The Non-Identity-Problem  
Let us start with the so-called non-identity problem, first described by Derek Parfit (1984), 
that permeates the discussion of intergenerational justice. Future people do not exist today. 
Even more, decisions we make today influence the very existence of future people. Suppose 
we have two policies A and B.
4 A implicates the depletion of resources for future people, 
while B saves resources for future individuals. We would like to say that A is harmful for 
future generations. The problem is that  the choice of A affects the very existence (and 
number) of specific future individuals. Without the choice of A, some individuals would not 
have been born at all. If the life of those individuals is not totally miserable, it is therefore 
hard to claim those specific individuals have been harmed – unless one wants to put forth the 
rather implausible contention that existence can be a form of harm. Therefore, it may be 
difficult to argue for the choice of B solely on the basis that it enhances someone’s welfare 
who otherwise may not exist. 
The puzzle of non-identity has dominated the philosophical discussion of intergenerational 
justice during the past few decades. It is crucial to find one’s way around non-identity in order 
to be able to make consistent claims about future people’s well-being or needs fulfillment. In 
his survey on “Intergenerational Justice” Lucas Meyer (Meyer and Roser 2009) distinguishes 
between four main responses to circumvent the problem: first, future people cannot be the 
bearer of rights vis-à-vis the present generation. Second, rights of future generations can be 
violated even though those people cannot be harmed. Third, one may limit the practical focus 
of the non-identity problem by singling out those actions that are necessary conditions of the 
existence of the concerned person. One may thus say at least something about other, general 
conditions of life. Fourth, a theorist may interpret the notion of harm in a different, non-
comparative way. The goal of the latter is to claim that no matter, who X is, she is harmed if 
she is in circumstance Y. Harm and benefit are thus defined from an impersonal and objective 
point of view, which gives us a way around the identity-problem. 
Our commitment to a strict form of universality, which we have embraced above, rules out the 
first strategy as an option. The second strategy precludes speaking of welfare-rights insofar as 
violating a person’s welfare means harming her. It makes it difficult to keep the notion of 
human well-being in play which we find central. The third strategy is actually not a proper 
solution to the non-identity problem, since it only limits the questions that pertain to the issues 
of intergenerational justice. However, we want to be able to deal with justice in a full sense. 
Hence, we opt for strategy number four which we will flesh out below by using the CA. 
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ii)  Insecurities and lack of knowledge 
Suggesting political principles for the future involves a considerable amount of guess-work 
and uncertainties: for instance, we cannot possibly know what kind of technologies people in 
the future will have access to. We can also only extrapolate how society and natural systems 
sustaining societies will change, and this extrapolation clearly has limits due to ambiguity, 
threshold effects, non-linearities and the like (Leach et al. 2010). It is not clear whether people 
in the future will have a similar notion of the good life as we have now; maybe their standards 
of the good have changed dramatically, depending on the social and environmental changes 
that have ensued meanwhile
5. Furthermore, we cannot even fully predict how many people 
there will be – thus it is difficult to allocate a certain amount of resources. 
These factors considerably influence what kind of resources or benefits future people need. 
Still, we follow a universal presumption: people do not change dramatically in their basic 
constitution: they still have biological needs, a want for sociality, they still lead a certain kind 
of life due to their choices and the circumstances surrounding them. Thus, we can make 
presumptions with regard to the basic human make-up.  
iii)  Lack of overlap and cooperation 
The intergenerational realm poses a special problem for those theories that rely on the idea of 
mutual cooperation, most notably the accounts of a social contract. It is hard to explain how 
parties  who  do  not  exist  in  the  situation  where  the  contract  is  generated  can  be  able  to 
participate in this project. There is thus no mutual enforceability between generations that do 
not overlap.
6 An additional complicating factor lies in the uncertainty about the number of 
generations to consider: If it is assumed that the pool of non -renewable resources is divided 
up among all human beings, one must know how many of them there will be in total, in order 
to divide up this pool fairly. Finally, the intergenerational realm is characterized by power -
asymmetries of different kinds: while we can assume that people in the future will know more 
about the world than we do (although this is also not certain), we a lso have considerable 
influence on them by our actions about e.g. resources, procreation etc.  
All this makes it difficult to argue for any obligation towards future people based on some 
form of cooperation. In our view, these problems give us a good enough reason to search for a 
                                                 
5 This certainly was a reason why the Brundtland Commission referred to rather essential needs such as food, 
clothing, shelter, jobs, even though the universality of particularly the latter can be disputed as pertaining to 
specific socio-economic forms. 
6 Actually, we find some minor forms of asymmetries also within generations, e.g. between children and adult or 
older, deprived people and young, active ones. 9 
theory that does not fundamentally hinge on cooperation. The CA, which places its emphasis 
on protecting people’s well-being appears to be a better candidate in our view. 
iv)  The relationship between generations 
Another  problem  in  the  present  discussion  is  the  question  of  defining  the  scope  of 
intergenerational  justice  in  more  detail.  If  we  focus  on  the  obligations  of  present  people 
towards future generations, we have to ask how far these reach. Should present people only 
care for their successors, i.e. the following generations? Or does every generation have to see 
to it that there is enough for every generation in the future? The latter does not only raise 
problems, because it is hard to tell how many generations there will be in the future, and what 
things these might consider essential for their well-being. Also, it may put excessive demands 
on present generations, so that their standard of living would be severely constrained. 
But  even  if  we  opt  for  the  more  moderate  option,  a  related  issue  crops  up  about  the 
relationship between generations. Regard for future generations will often imply restrictions 
for  the  present  generations.  This  is  reflected  in  the  common  call  for  using  the  planet’s 
resources  in  a responsible way instead of depleting them.  If, as  it is  with  most of them, 
resources are scarce, then the demand for preservation puts restrictions on how people live in 
the present. Since we advocate the universality of justice, we deem restrictions of this kind 
justifiable in principle. 
v) The motivational problem 
Why should we, as the people existing now, care about the interests and lives of people who 
are not even born and act accordingly? There is a gap between knowing about the problems 
that might occur for future generations and doing something about it oneself now (Birnbacher 
2009).
 This issue is quite different from the problems of allocation that we have discussed so 
far. It is less concerned with institutions like the state, but rather with every citizen who can 
influence future events. Though it is mainly a psychological problem, theories of justice also 
provide  answers  depending  on  the  underlying  view  of  personhood.  A  contractarian,  for 
instance, may argue for the force of contracts and ideas of mutual advantage thus appealing to 
rationality and sensibility as the motivating factors for action. But it is also possible to rely on 
indirect motivations by setting incentives for certain types of behavior or by self-binding if 
the appeal to rational arguments is not deemed to be sufficient. From a political viewpoint, 
which forms a big part of the discussion about SD, this is a quite central issue: if the interests 
of future generations should be respected, authorities must find a way, how to obligate and 
motivate people in the present.  10 
Often the motivation and obligation of parents to care for the well-being of their children is 
used as an analogy in political as well as in scientific documents on sustainability (for the 
latter see Howarth 2007).This basis clearly is insufficient for a universal theory of justice, as 
documented  empirically  by  the  gap  between  pro-environment  attitudes  and  behavior  for 
example.  
4. The CA as a framework for intergenerational justice 
In recent years, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have both published books about justice 
and the role of capabilities in this matter (Sen 2010a). Small passages in these works also 
pertain  to  the  question  of  intergenerational  justice  and  sustainability.  Yet,  there  is  no 
capability theory of justice that covers all the issues we have identified in the first two parts of 
this essay. Nussbaum’s (2006) account of capabilities as basic political entitlements is more 
complete in this respect, but she also admits that it only encompasses a partial theory of 
justice.  
We believe that  the CA has  considerable potential  for solving issues  of intergenerational 
justice, but that enrichments are in order for employing it in this context. We are further aware 
that Sen’s and Nussbaum’s accounts of the CA differ in important respects (Leßmann 2007). 
There is no room to go into all of these points in this paper, so that we only address the 
differences when they become relevant. Before we analyze the CA’s potential in more detail, 
it is necessary to lay out the fundamental concepts of the CA as we take it for our purposes. 
a.  The CA: basic features 
The CA is not a theory of justice in the sense specified above. It neither provides us with a 
(full) list of principles of justice in the sense of (ii) nor with a model of justification in the 
sense of (iii). Yet, as we have pointed out in the first part of this essay, some normative 
principles  that  regulate  the  distribution  of  “the  currency  of  justice”  seem  to  be  required. 
Otherwise  there  is  little  guidance  on  what  to  save  and  how  much  of  it.  Given  Sen’s 
reservation  against  the  formulation  of  principles
7,  what  can  we  learn  from  employing 
capabilities in the context of intergenerational justice? 
As Sen (1993) pointed out in The Quality of Life “the capability approach is concerned with 
showing  the  cogency  of  a  particular  space  for  evaluation  of  individual  opportunities  and 
successes”. In his The Idea of Justice he puts it thus: “Capability is, in fact, no more than a 
perspective in terms of which the advantages and disadvantages of a person can be reasonably 
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assessed” (Sen 2010a). This perspective can be employed for several purposes, e.g. in social 
sciences or economics. In this paper, we sketch the CA’s perspective on intergenerational 
justice. As a starting we will, however, take Sen’s idea of capabilities, since it provides the 
most refined and developed understanding of capabilities so far.  
Sen argued that the traditional approaches to measure human well-being are not able to come 
to grip with certain human inequalities. For instance, an able bodied man and a person in a 
wheelchair may well have the same amount of resources at their command, but the latter is 
not able to make use of them in the same manner, since he needs more resources in order to 
counterbalance his handicap. Thus, people who possess the same amount of resources may yet 
not have the same quality of life due to their differences in conversing resources into doings 
and beings (functionings).  
Sen advocates that the concern of evaluations and policies should focus on both: on what 
people actually do and are, i.e. their functionings, but also on what people can do and be, i.e. 
their capabilities. According to Sen, functionings are human beings and doings that people 
value and have reason to value. This includes elementary beings and doings such as being 
adequately nourished, complex ones such as being able to participate in political activities, but 
also things we consider as “trivial” from an ethical point of view such as being able to drum a 
solo (Sen 1999). Capabilities, or rather a person’s capability set, are defined derivatively from 
functionings  (Sen  1993):  it  comprises  the  many  different  combinations  or  bundles  of 
functionings that a person can achieve. Thus, it comprises the meaningful opportunities that a 
person could achieve in his life.  
We  like  to  draw  attention  to  three  key  features  of  the  CA  that  we  employ  for  the 
intergenerational realm. First, the CA lays considerable emphasis on the importance of human 
freedom and agency. What matters from the CA’s normative perspective is that a  person 
commands her effective opportunities to undertake the actions she wants to and thus lives the 
kinds of lives she desires. 
Second,  the  importance  of  resources  and  commodities  is  not  neglected.  To  function  in  a 
certain way typically presupposes the availability of particular commodities. However, the 
CA  demands  that  we  must  also  regard  a  person’s  ability  to  convert  resources  into 
functionings. For instance, take the functioning to move for longer distances: it presupposes 
the availability of a bike, car or public transport as well as the money for it. Conversion 
factors do not only include a person’s abilities and skills, i.e. the personal conversion factors. 
They  also  comprise  social  conversion  factors  given  by  social  norms  and  institutions  that 12 
shape the availability of options as well as environmental conversion factors such as climate 
and geography (Robeyns 2005a). 
Third,  the  CA  is  not  confined  to  either  developing  or  affluent  countries,  but  views 
functionings and capabilities as suitable for measuring people’s well-being globally. It is thus 
a universalist theory (Nussbaum and Sen 1989), but insists at the same time on the importance 
of  the  actual  context  for  interpreting  and  realizing  capabilities  in  a  particular  society 
(Nussbaum 2001). The CA’s emphasis on human freedom secures respect for different forms 
of life. The CA does not impose a “general comprehensive view” of the good on people, 
which Rawls (2005) defines as including “conceptions of what is of value in human life, and 
ideals of personal character, as well as ideal of friendship and associational relationships, and 
much  else  that  is  to  inform  our  conduct”.  The  CA,  as  we  take  it,  is  at  least  partially 
comprehensive in Rawls’ sense, by containing a general provision that freedom of choice is 
essential for a good life. Being free to lead a life one values and has reason to value is the core 
of this universal view of a good life. 
With regard to SD it has to be further inquired in what way the CA is universal. Does it also 
extend to animals and nature in general? Even though Nussbaum’s (2006, 2011) recent work 
suggests as much, we believe it to be adequate to confine ourselves to an anthropocentric 
stance for two reasons.  First,  the idea of capabilities,  as  Sen defines  them,  bears a close 
connection to human agency. It is quite open issue whether they can be ascribed in a similar 
manner to animals and other beings. Second, human well-being conceived of in terms of the 
CA  is  as  such  closely  related  to  the  non-human  environment.  The  latter  provides  the 
preconditions  and  relationships,  which  are  necessary  for  human  well-being.  Hence,  the 
universal scope which we assign to the CA concerns mainly human beings. 
These three features comprise the underlying considerations for employing the CA in the 
context of intergenerational justice. 
b.  The CA: a measuring rod for well-being and justice 
We  think  that  there  is  one  weighty  reason  for  considering  capabilities  in  the  context  of 
intergenerational justice: the CA offers a very convincing account for the so-called “currency 
of justice” as formulated in (i) above. As Ingrid Robeyns (2009) explicates, functionings and 
capabilities encompass the metric for making interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In this 
way, the CA offers a way of viewing a person’s well-being.  
Robeyns demands that a full capability theory of justice would need to show why it serves as 
a  better  metric  than  other  proposals  of  metrics  found  in  the  literature,  e.g.  resources  or 
preference  satisfaction.  Capability  theorists  have  employed  several  lines  of  arguments  to 13 
argue for capabilities as the superior measure, especially with the aim of establishing it as an 
alternative  to  Rawls’  primary  goods.  We  deem  it  wise  to  confine  ourselves  to  a  more 
moderate goal. Our goal is to point out in which ways the CA is a very attractive approach to 
the metrics of justice that should get more attention in the discussion of sustainability.  
In our view the metric of the CA offers a convincing formulation of human well-being as the 
goal of justice and sustainable development: one that does not stop short after distributing 
resources without acknowledging human diversity in the way just specified (such as Rawls’ 
or Dworkin’s accounts). Unlike such resource-based accounts of justice the CA does  not 
assume a fixed relationship between resources and well-being, but rather allows for individual 
differences in the amounts and nature of resources needed to achieve well-being. This is most 
obvious in the case of severely disabled persons, but holds for more prevalent differences 
such as climatic conditions, work environment or bodily characteristics (Sen 1980).  
Yet, the CA does not support blunt interference or paternalism for two reasons.
8 First, though 
it holds that theories of justice should factor in information about well-being (Sen 1985), this 
is not to say that well-being is the only concern of justice. Second, the CA respects and 
protects  people’s  freedom  to  form  their  own  view  on  what  constitutes  a  good  life  by 
emphasizing  the  importance  of  having  a  set  of  feasible  options  –  the  capability  set  (Sen 
2010a, Nussbaum 2001). An essential feature of well-being is the ability to choose from a 
menu of worthwhile options. This should preclude any commitment to a certain ideal life 
form. In political practice this will e.g. amount to protecting the opportunities that people can 
live well. It has to be admitted that there may be some critical areas, in which the question of 
imposition and paternalism crops up again (e.g. when it comes to Nussbaum’s basic or rather 
innate capabilities). But the CA generally is very sensitive about protecting pluralism given its 
commitment  to  well-being  and  it  is  a  liberal  theory  of  justice  in  viewing  persons  as 
responsible agents rather than patients (Sen 2010a). 
Plus,  the  CA  neither  goes  to  such  length  as  utilitarianism,  which  evaluates  well-being 
exclusively by the resulting happiness or utility. As it has been shown, the CA is also not 
consequentialist  like  utilitarianism  in  that  it  takes  information  beyond  consequences  into 
account. Though the actual life situation is crucial for looking at well-being, it also matters 
how this life situation has come about.  
The CA’s concept of well-being is then characterized by two features: (a) the plurality of 
dimensions and (b) the importance of human agency. As regards (a), we see the recognition of 
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irreducible plurality of dimensions as a strength of the CA. Justice should deal with many 
aspects  of  human  life,  e.g.  material  justice,  political  participation,  education  etc.,  which 
cannot be reduced to one of them. The CA thus incorporates all dimensions which belong to a 
valuable life. The specification and weighting of these dimensions is to be based on public 
reasoning (Sen 2010a, Nussbaum 2001). It is useful to differentiate between two claims: first, 
the  general,  universal  claim  that  functionings  and  capabilities  should  be  the  basis  for 
measuring  human  well-being,  and  second,  the  concrete  definition  of  functionings  and 
capabilities  within  the  context  of  a  society.  Sen  and  Nussbaum  stress  that  the  form  and 
content  of  capabilities  is  thoroughly  shaped  by  the  societal  context  –  after  all,  society 
determines the distribution of resources as well as a great variety of conversion factors. This 
is, in our view, not an obstacle to taking capabilities as the goal of future ethics: For future 
individuals we may also well assume a certain form of plurality that permeates human life. 
Future generations will live a life that is different from ours, but their lives will be similar to 
ours  in  being  pluralist  and  their  societies  will  be  multi-faceted.  As  a  consequence  of  its 
pluralist conception, however, the CA does not arrive at clear-cut recommendations how to 
design the distribution of capabilities or the distribution of resources and conversion factors 
for that matter. Much of this has to be left to the decision of the individuals involved. Yet, the 
CA has some cutting power e.g. when pointing to the freedom of today’s people (Sen 2010a). 
With respect to (b), human agency has at least two roles in the CA: First the one hinted at 
above  of  selecting  and  weighting  dimensions.  This  is  thought  to  be  a  task  for  public 
discussion and deliberation, ideally leading to an overlapping consensus. Secondly, persons 
are always seen as agents who choose their way of life from among several possible ways of 
life open to them – their capabilities. Hence, enhancing human capabilities now and in future 
means  to  protect  a  wide  range  of  valuable  functionings  for  people  to  choose  from.  This 
includes provision of the necessary material resources, e.g. money, material goods, but also 
promoting the preconditions for converting them into functionings. 
As an upshot of the two features of human well-being, the CA retains a pluralistic view on 
human freedom. This seems particularly appropriate for future people, since there necessarily 
is much ignorance and uncertainty on their specific ways of life as well as the technological, 
societal, and natural context they will find themselves in. This problem has already been 
discussed above. However, we can still safely assume that people will want to live a good life 
according to their own light and thus need the respective prerequisites. The CA is thus able to 
deal  with  the  uncertainties  and  lack  of  knowledge  that  we  have  explicated  above  while 
maintaining some  core  normative demands by  directing the objective  of intergenerational 15 
justice to the freedom to lead a life one values rather than asking for a certain amount of 
resources to be preserved (some of which future people may not even need or want).  
Though the CA mainly introduces (i) a metric of justice and does not offer (ii) principles of 
justice – partly in consequence of the metric it offers – it provides some ideas on the issue of 
(iii)  justification  and  (iv)  the  scope  of  justice,  such  as  Nussbaum’s  (2006)  reliance  on 
“cultivating  humanity”.  Also,  Sen’s  Smithian  “impartial  spectator  might  be  employed  to 
formulate more concrete principles of justice (even though Sen refrains from doing so). 
In any case, instead of putting the nub of a theory of justice in reciprocity, the CA’s main 
emphasis lies on creating a normative picture of man, which gives the basis to measure well-
being and draw policy implications. It is not necessary that the people affected need to work 
out an agreement or negotiate as it is done e.g. in many contractualist theories. Still, it might 
be  objected,  that  the  specification  of  capabilities  by  a  participatory  process  is  similar  to 
contractualist  agreements  (Sen  2010b).  Given  the  problem  about  reciprocity  in 
contractualism, we may very well ask whether the CA will run into similar difficulties when 
specifying  the  relevant  capabilities,  and  herewith  the  relevant  resources  and  conversion 
factors. Finally, as has been mentioned, the CA embraces universality in a full sense. The CA 
was explicitly designed to assess the well-being of people within all nations or societies (even 
though, as Sen stresses, societal context is important in defining particular capabilities). As a 
matter of consequence, the CA has the potential to be extended to other generations of people 
(Anand and Sen 2000). It does not seem to make much difference in principle at what time 
these people live – they are still human beings. Also we aim at employing the CA in a general 
way  as  a  basis  of  intergenerational  justice.  Capabilities  provide  the  general  evaluative 
perspective from which we judge human well-being and justice – the concrete definition of 
capabilities is still left in the hand of the people affected.  
Hence, the CA offers a plausible metric for intergenerational justice. But as we have seen, the 
way to providing a complete account of justice is still long. Especially with regard to future 
generations the question of non-identity remains a serious issue.  
c.  A threshold of well-being based on the CA 
In our previous discussion of the non-identity-problem we have claimed that the idea of a 
threshold  of  well-being  constitutes  a  viable  solution  for  the  non-identity-problem.  In  his 
discussion of a sufficientarian approach to intergenerational justice, Meyer elaborates that the 
notion of harm is usually taken in a comparative sense: it is defined as relative to a specific 
person who can compare her well-being at time t1 with her well-being at t2. If she has less 
well-being at t2, we can say that she is worse off and thus harmed. Hence, the non-identity 16 
problem ensues, since there is no earlier time t1 to which to compare a person’s well-being. 
Another  possible  understanding  of  harm  defines  it  as  absolute,  i.e.  valid  for  all  people 
regardless of their special identity. Often, this absolute limit is formulated as a basic threshold 
of well-being
9. If a person is in a sub-threshold-state, we can say that she is ipso facto harmed, 
even if she was brought into existence by the action related to that state.  
Employing the notion of a threshold thus avoids the non-identity-problem for those cases in 
which persons can be said to fall under the basic threshold, since we do not have to compare 
the situation of a person that exists due to a certain action with a state in which she does not 
exist.
10 We believe that the CA is a good basis to define a suitable threshold. Nussbaum 
(2006) explicitly does so by devising a list of basic capabilities, which she calls “central 
human capabilities” that should be guaranteed constitutionally. In a similar manner Elizabeth 
Anderson (1999) develops a CA based account of justice by introducing a sufficientarian 
standard of what she takes to be the basic capabilities of citizens in a democracy. 
Even though Sen’s and Nussbaum’s accounts of capabilities differ in some crucial conceptual 
aspects, the idea of a threshold is also applicable to Sen’s account of capability. Sen (1995) 
also employs it implicitly in his account of poverty by talking about “basic capabilities”:
 “The 
term ‚basic capabilities’, which I had used in ‚Equality of What?’ (Sen 1980), was intended to 
separate out the ability to satisfy certain elementary and crucially important functionings up to 
certain  levels.”  He  also  agrees  with  Nussbaum  about  the  importance  of  thresholds  (Sen 
2010b). 
Creating a sufficientarian theory of justice based on the CA means singling out a minimum of 
capabilities that no person should fall short of. This also addresses the problem of uncertainty 
mentioned above. Since there are many aspects of future living conditions that we cannot 
foresee, it seems sensible to confine ourselves to essential normative demands. Even though 
the idea of a threshold has its appeal, it entails several theoretical problems, for instance, that 
it does not entail a rule for distributing capabilities beyond the threshold. Also, the plausibility 
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of a threshold approach rests on the specification of what the most basic, human minimum 
that is worth protecting. The threshold itself must also be specified in a non-arbitrary way.
  
These problems are too ample to be dealt with here.
11  In any case, they have to be kept firmly 
in mind, but they need not be seen as an embarrassment. Despite all limits a sufficientarian 
principle  gives  advice  with  respect  to  some  choices  and  will  serve  to  make  the  world 
comparatively more just than today. It is thus a principle in line with Sen’s (2010a) idea of 
comparative approaches to justice in contrast to transcendental approaches. 
d.  The CA and sustainable development 
In the beginning of this paper we have outlined how the concept of SD is notoriously difficult, 
because it is not an agreed theoretical notion. Rather it constitutes a political schema (or a 
meta-approach, Spangenberg 2005) that encompasses a variety of partly conflicting concepts 
and  normative  aspects  (Ott  and  Döring  2004).  With  the  main  features  of  the  CA  and 
intergenerational justice lying before us, we may ask how we can shed light on this difficult 
notion.  
The topic of intergenerational justice as an essential part of SD is not very prominent among 
advocates of the CA, but we can find some helpful remarks. We find short passages about SD 
in Sen’s latest book as well as in Sabina Alkire’s and Severine Deneulin’s (2009) introduction 
to “The Human Development and the Capability Approach”. These considerations provide 
insight in two ways. 
First,  Sen  advocates  that  the  Brundtland-definition  (as  mentioned  above)  should  be 
reformulated by substituting “needs” by “capabilities”. He thus claims that the goal of SD 
should be defined as the protection or even the enhancement of substantial freedoms. This 
yields, in his view, a far broader and more sophisticated concept for preserving the well-being 
of future individuals. Sen’s view fits well with our take on the CA’s role in intergenerational 
justice: capabilities are defined as the metric of intergenerational justice. Thus it also can be 
interpreted as the objective of justice, i.e. what we should protect for people that are subject to 
it. Given the strong tie between intergenerational justice and the idea of SD, we can thus 
stipulate that they should be directed to the same goal. As capabilities are determined by 
personal and social (systemic) factors, a CA-based definition of SD also needs to conceptually 
combine  individual  and  systemic  perspectives  on  development.  We  should  see  to  it  that 
people’s capabilities are not only protected in the present, but also in the future. However, Sen 
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does not explain how capabilities of future generations can be defined, let alone how to deal 
with the inherent ignorance of the future technological, societal, and natural environment.
12 
Second, Alkire and Deneulin agree that the CA determines the substantial goal of human 
development. But further, they employ sustainability as a principle that regulates the process 
of promoting human development.
13 According to them, sustainability refers to “advancing 
human development such that outcomes progress in all spheres – social, political and financial 
–  endures  over  time”  (Alkire  and  Deneulin  2009).  Hence,  sustainability  is  defined  as  a 
principle that regulates the employment of the CA in promoting human development along 
with the SD-related principles of equity, efficiency and participation. If this idea is applied to 
the context of justice, we may think of SD as a principle in the sense of (ii) defined above, i.e. 
as a rule that regulates the proper distribution of benefits.  
It makes sense to interpret SD as a normative principle that guides actions towards present 
and future human beings. After all, the concept of SD should have implications for normative 
theories and political practice. Yet, Alkire’s and Deneulin’s formulation of the principle is not 
very helpful in elucidating this principle. It merely expresses the thought that sustainability 
basically  means  that  we  should  “sustain  some  X”,  as  Barry  (1997)  explains.  But  more 
guidance is needed on how much and how long we should sustain some valuable entity – 
questions typically answered by the various disciplinary fields, as they also relate to causality 
in natural and social systems (and are not limited to purely ethical considerations), and what 
this means for more tangible aspects, if the “X” to be sustained is itself not very concrete. 
Still, the CA is helpful in one crucial respect, namely in setting out the objective of SD and 
intergenerational justice. It thus determines the starting point for building a further account of 
intergenerational justice that fills out the normative aspect of SD (Rauschmayer et al. 2011).  
5. Outlook: CA, intergenerational justice and SD 
The CA holds some promise of dealing with issues of intergenerational justice and SD. We 
have  argued  that  the  CA  should  mainly  be  used  to  define  the  metric  within  a  theory  of 
intergenerational justice. It thereby characterizes those valuable entities which we want to 
protect  for  people  as  a  matter  of  justice  –  in  the  intra-  and  intergenerational  realm. 
Furthermore,  this  use  of  the  CA  links  intergenerational  justice  to  SD:  as  an  evaluative 
perspective on well-being, the CA defines the goal of SD in a more refined way than the 
Brundtland definition is able to do. 
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However, several crucial issues remain open. First, the CA only presents a  part within a 
theory of justice. In particular, it lacks a systematic philosophical justification. This may seem 
to be only indirectly relevant for the problem of a non-scientific (i.e. political) interpretation 
of SD. However, as we have seen from our consideration of the Rawlsian model, the model of 
justification  directs  the  selection  of  principles  and  patterns  of  justice.  As  a  consequence, 
advocates of the CA rarely formulate explicit principles that regulate how functionings or 
rather capabilities should be protected or distributed in a society. The sufficientarian account 
that we have sketched in the second part of our paper starts to fill this lacuna, but has to be 
spelled out in more detail, e.g. whether it is a prioritarian or a weaker kind of view.  
Second, as we have mentioned, Sen leaves the selection of valuable capabilities largely in the 
hand of the society to which they are relevant. Hence, he refrains from giving a universal 
account of capabilities. He does not state either which capabilities should be protected by law, 
and, of course, which of them should be preserved for future generations. In contrast to Sen, 
Nussbaum is very concrete about these matters, but her claims remain contentious in many 
ways.  If,  as  we  plan  to  do,  one  aims  to  construct  a  threshold  of  well-being  based  on 
capabilities, it is crucial to identify basic dimensions of human well-being and basic levels of 
them. There are further some other questions with regard to its construction.  
Third, the peculiar problems that the intergenerational context poses can only be partially 
answered by the CA. Hence, little can be inferred from the works on the CA how conflicts of 
justice claims should be conceptualized intergenerationally – much less how they should be 
handled. Within the discussion of intergenerational justice, a very complex task consists in 
justifying that the claims of the present generations should be curtailed in order to satisfy the 
claims of the following ones (as is also suggested be the Brundtland definition). This may 
come down to curtailing capabilities of existing people in a more or less severe manner. As 
we  have  already  explicated  above,  a  threshold  conception  can  only  solve  this  problem 
partially. Above the threshold, it remains unclear how conflicts between capability claims are 
to be solved. It may, however, very well be that the CA yields definite results here: moral 
conflicts can be irresolvable, also in the intergenerational context.  
Fourth, CA theorists do not often address the problem how people are motivated to protect 
others’ capabilities and how they are obligated to do so. Further, this does not translate well to 
the intergenerational realm since the CA cannot justify why present people should preserve 
capabilities of future people on the cost of having their own capabilities curtailed. There are, 
however, some features about the CA and similar considerations that can be employed to 
supplement the CA accordingly. Ortrud Leßmann (2010) argues that we can employ Sen’s 20 
notion of commitments to justify intergenerational concerns: our identity as a member in the 
group of humans causes us to share the goals of the human race and thus motivates us to care 
for other human beings including future ones. This offers a promising route for supplementing 
the CA which should be further pursued.  
Aside from the issues just named, there is of course a considerable amount of other issues 
about SD that we cannot discuss here. One of them is the question how to implement the 
demands of intergenerational justice and SD in political practice. Though the question of 
motivation just mentioned is important it does not suffice to prompt action. In particular, the 
issue of responsibility for SD policy has to be tackled explicitly which entails the question 
how individual and collective agency are related.  
It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  CA  or  any  modification  of  it  is  able  to  handle  these 
problems. Given the complexity of these issues, there is little hope, we believe, that the CA 
can cover all the bases. To achieve more theoretical progress, it may be helpful to supplement 
the CA with elements of other approaches where they fit and provide the necessary insight. 
We have already supplemented the CA by employing a sufficientarian principle which needs 
to be further elaborated on. But many questions still remain open for discussion. 21 
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